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A 
patent is a formidable thing. In the United States, it affords 
twenty years of nearly ironclad protection to an inventor who 
can prove, after considerable expenditure of time and money, that 
some new process for manufacturing widgets is a novel and non 
obvious addition to what legal practitioners call the "prior art"-?all 
those processes for manufacturing widgets that others have thought 
up in the past. Once the federal government has conferred a patent 
upon an inventor, competitors must have a care. A successful inven 
tion inspires imitation, but if the imitation is too close, its author may 
get slapped with a lawsuit. In the high-dollar world of patents, losing 
an infringement suit can mean facing damages of millions or even 
billions of dollars.1 
So imitators have to be as ingenious as the inventors they seek 
to imitate/Patent law encourages such ingenuity by permitting a 
clever competitor to "design around" a patent in such a way as to 
create a product that is the functional equivalent of the protected idea 
but narrowly avoids entering the forbidden zone of infringement. 
Economic policy also favors design-arounds. While non-infringing 
copycat products may threaten patentees' revenues, they also make 
the marketplace more competitive and drive down the price of prod 
ucts?consequences that are widely considered to be socially desir 
able.2 It takes skill and legal acumen to come up with 
a successful 
design-around. Many have devoted their careers to brainstorming 
these legitimate knockoffs. 
The humanities are perhaps the last place we would expect 
to 
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encounter this art of the barely legal approximation, but the past few 
years have witnessed the growing phenomenon of design-around 
scholarship. As copyrights grow longer and their owners become 
more chary of permissions, as publishers retreat from the exercise 
of fair use and take refuge in parsimonious word counts and rigid 
permissions policies, copyrights are coming to resemble closely 
guarded patents.3 This is a perverse development, and one that 
courts have historically frowned upon. In one well-known case, a 
copyright owner who had authored a set of simple rules for running 
a sweepstakes contest tried to prevent another promoter from using 
the same basic rules in its own contest materials. A panel of federal 
judges rejected this attempt to turn a copyright claim into a de facto 
patent: "We cannot recognize copyright as a game of chess in which 
the public can be checkmated."4 
I. The Heirloom Fallacy: Grandmother's 
Necklace and Grandfather's Letter 
Traditionally, courts and legislatures have resisted what might be 
called the patentization of copyrights. Copyrights are porous rights. 
While they confer a monopoly on creative expression, the doctrine 
of fair use and the idea /expression dichotomy?to name two vener 
able limitations on copyright control?permit unauthorized use of 
portions of that expression. As the great Judge Learned Hand wrote 
of Abie's Irish Rose, Anne Nichols's 1920s stage comedy about Irish 
Jewish intermarriage: "her copyright did not cover everything that 
might be drawn from her play; its content went to some extent into 
the public domain."5 Courts have long recognized the leaky nature 
of copyrights, but the judiciary is only one aspect of the chess game 
that keeps copyright law true to itself. Authors, editors, and, equally 
importantly in the present context, publishers must exercise the fair 
use privilege or watch it atrophy. More than a few publishers, intimi 
dated by the clamor of copyright owners, have lost their nerve. 
Caught between assertive copyright holders and risk-averse pub 
lishers, many academic authors have experienced total market fail 
ure?a breakdown of bargaining with the copyright owner, coupled 
with a denial of fair use by the publisher.6 The breakdown is total 
because when denial of permission to quote (market failure) is com 
bined with refusal to exercise fair use (closure of market alternatives), 
checkmate has occurred in copyright's chess game. If modernism is 
aptly defined as "that which is still propertized,"7 it is also the case 
that in the hands of remote and unsympathetic owners, this property 
increasingly lacks one of property's traditional characteristics: social 
utility. Intellectual property that cannot be used is a deadweight loss 
to society.8 It is like grandmother's necklace, which is taken from its 
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drawer once a year for a memorial caress. But an author's text is dif 
ferent from the one-of-a-kind necklace that is sentimentally hoarded. 
A text is an intangible public good that can be reproduced and dissemi 
nated at relatively little cost, for the social weal, without depletion of 
its source.9 
Let's take a hypothetical case prompted by my simile of the neck 
lace. James Joyce's grandson, Stephen James Joyce, or his wife, is 
believed to own the necklace with the inscribed ivory tablet which 
Joyce gave to Nora Barnacle in 1909.10 The necklace is a private, tan 
gible chattel of a sort that would normally have a sentimental value 
far exceeding its market value. (Of course, this particular heirloom 
probably has an enhanced market value as well, because of the fame 
of its original purchaser.) Now consider another piece of property 
that is privately owned: the copyright in the letter, dated 3 September 
1909, in which Joyce elaborately described for Nora the necklace 
(or "necklet," as he called it), its inscription, and the sadness and 
loneliness that lay behind his purchase of the gift (LettersII 245-46). 
The original document is held in the special collections of Cornell 
University and was first published in 1966. Stephen Joyce's public 
statements lead me to believe that, if asked, he might say that these 
two pieces of property?the necklace and the copyright?are funda 
mentally the same as far as ownership rights are concerned, the more 
so because they both involve "private" family matters.11 And Mr. 
Joyce might consider himself justified in refusing absolutely, on the 
one hand, to sell the necklace to a French banker and, on the other, to 
give an Australian Ph.D. candidate permission to reproduce the text 
of the letter in her dissertation.12 
In treating both kinds of property as essentially private and price 
less, an owner would be engendering what I have described as mar 
ket failure; but only in the case of the refused permission would the 
market failure have significant public consequences. Let's call these 
common attitudes toward intellectual property the Heirloom Fallacy 
and the Pricelessness Problem. Both attitudes are rooted in the popu 
lar assumption that copyrights are the same as traditional kinds of 
property. As Lawrence Lessig has explained: 
[OJrdinary people think about "property" differently [from intellectual 
property lawyers]. 
. . . 
"Property," ordinary people think, is "absolute 
and mine forever." If you say to ordinary people, "What do you think 
of the idea of fair use of your property or only having your property for 
limited times?" they are likely to think, "Well, that's weird. You don't 
have a fair use right to my car, nor are you able to say after a limited 
time the state can come in and take away my house."13 
With the Heirloom Fallacy, a public good like an epistolary text 
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is treated by the copyright holder as a wholly private, intimate pos 
session, even though the original document may reside in a public 
archive or its contents may have been published.14 The Pricelessness 
Problem arises when this intangible property becomes emotionally 
charged with a pathos of uniqueness that removes it from the social 
izing forces of the marketplace, both of ideas and economics. These 
two overlapping views of "mine and thine"?the Heirloom Fallacy 
and the Pricelessness Problem?can combine to shut down the social 
utility of copyrighted works. 
When copyrights are used as a tool for suppressing information, at 
least three parties are affected: "(1) the person who seeks or threatens 
to make the contested use . . ., (2) the copyright owner who wants to 
keep the material from being copied . . . , and (3) the person or per 
sons who would want to see the material (the potential recipients),"15 
As a result of this "suppression triangle," as Wendy J. Gordon calls 
it ("Commodification" 175), the interests of the absent party?the 
public?are sacrificed. Here, Adam Smith's notion of the "invisible 
hand," that economic force which theoretically pilots private inter 
est and social need into alignment, is inadequate to the task.16 The 
breakdown of bargaining might give some private, nonmonetary 
satisfaction to the copyright holder, but it results in a deadweight 
loss to society?the suppression both of the words contained in the 
document and of the scholarly analysis that would have framed 
and transformed those words for the enlightenment of readers. It is 
precisely this intellectually transformative act which is the essence of 
responsible, evidence-based scholarship in the humanities. 
Unlike grandmother's necklace, grandfather's letter (and, even 
more clearly, his novel) is a public good, a piece of property that 
can inform, educate, and perhaps move countless readers.17 But 
because legislators have seen fit to extend copyright terms and 
thus to hand control of these public goods over to remote heirs and 
transferees?who, in some cases, are unaware of or indifferent to the 
social and cultural consequences of their attitudes?the distinction 
between grandmother's necklace and grandfather's letter is blurred 
in the minds of copyright owners and the public alike. And when a 
descendant, armed with lawyers, access to the popular press, and 
the prestige of genetic fortuity, makes it known that quotation from 
"private" family documents is strongly disfavored?even though 
the documents are already published or are held in collections open 
to the public?reliance on the fair-use privilege is likely to become a 
casualty. We have entered the Era of Forbidden Quotation. 
Scholars and critics have increasingly resorted to strategies for 
sidestepping this problem. By trimming quotations to the bone or 
forgoing them altogether, by deleting all unpublished material or 
paraphrasing it nearly out of existence, by using public-domain edi 
566 
This content downloaded from 129.244.1.198 on Thu, 11 Jul 2013 15:34:05 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
tions in place of better, copyrighted ones, academic authors are prac 
ticing the art of designing around copyrights. By "designing around 
copyrights" I do not mean the traditional scholarly exercise of honest 
fair-use quotation or informative paraphrase, but rather the skittish 
use of these time-honored tools, as if they did not lawfully exist or 
were no longer safe to employ as fully as in the past. Design-around 
scholarship often amounts to a kind of perverse self-denial?perverse 
because not warranted by the porous nature of copyrights. 
We have seen this phenomenon take root in Joyce studies. A strik 
ing example, bordering on the bizarre, is found in J. C. C. Mays's 
bibliographic study, Fredson Bowers and the Irish Wolfhound, in which 
Mays had intended to reproduce Joyce's hand-drawn diagram of 
biological and evolutionary themes underlying "Oxen of the Sun."18 
Permission to reproduce was denied, and in place of Joyce's drawing, 
Mays substituted the following black-bordered notice: 
The copyright-holder has refused permission to reproduce the chosen 
illustration and the reader must therefore consult either the original in 
London or a facsimile-transcription. 
. . . Meanwhile, visualize a sheet 
of paper containing nine enlarging ovals rising from the same base 
point, drawn to represent the stages of foetal growth. Minutely-written 
gynaecological details are inserted at the apex of eight of the nine ovals. 
Surrounding the design, crowding in from each corner of the page, are 
words and phrases chosen to illustrate successive phases in the evolu 
tion of English prose. (71) 
This unreasonable facsimile shows how much is lost by the substi 
tution of even a detailed "paraphrase" of Joyce's diagram. Copyright 
law's idea/expression dichotomy is little consolation for the reader 
deprived of Joyce's indispensable visual commentary on one of the 
most challenging episodes of Ulysses. 
But scholarly design-arounds have not been confined to local 
troubleshooting. After the Joyce Estate repeatedly expressed oppo 
sition to Carol Loeb Shloss's biography of Lucia Joyce, she and her 
publisher removed numerous pages of quotations from letters and 
documents that would have fortified her challenging interpretation of 
the relationship between Lucia and her father.19 In another case, 
a textual scholar, believing that a request for permission to quote 
would be fruitless, developed a code by which the contents of newly 
discovered Ulysses manuscripts may be discussed without a single 
verbatim quotation from those materials.20 Another scholar, noted for 
his close textual study of the genetic development of Ulysses, has writ 
ten several articles containing general descriptions and inventories 
of the recent manuscript discoveries but has scrupulously avoided 
offering extracts.21 The institutions that have paid millions of Euros 
or dollars for Joyce manuscripts have in a sense been cheated: in the 
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age of digital reproduction and cyberspace, to own physical texts that 
cannot be displayed or copied is, paradoxically, to possess something 
unreal. The aura of the archives is diminished to the extent that their 
contents lack a reproductive dimension.22 
The present review essay focuses on three symptoms of this era 
of increasingly patent-like copyrights and design-around scholar 
ship: Danis Rose's New Reader's Edition of Ulysses, a text which is 
as overtly shaped by copyright law as by scholarly erudition; John 
Kidd's unachieved "Dublin Edition" of Ulysses which, according to 
Bruce Arnold's revised Scandal of "Ulysses," failed to see publication 
in part because it fell afoul of copyright restrictions; and the final 
Texas installment of Joyce Studies Annual, in which its editor, Thomas 
F. Staley, tells us that he elected to terminate the series when his origi 
nal goal of publishing archive-based scholarship had come to seem 
impossible in light of the Joyce Estate's virtual ban on the quotation 
of unpublished Joyce materials. 
II. The New Lawyer's Edition of Ulysses 
In the United Kingdom and certain other European Union coun 
tries, lifetime-published editions of Ulysses entered the public domain 
when protection expired at the end of 1991, fifty years after Joyce's 
death. Shortly thereafter, the EU issued a directive that required EU 
countries to enact legislation extending copyright terms retroactively 
to seventy years post mortem auctoris. This meant that works which 
had been enjoying public-domain status, like Ulysses, were abruptly 
pulled back into copyright. The revived EU copyright in Ulysses will 
last, unless extended again, until the end of 2011?nearly a century 
of legal protection, all told. We are just beginning to see the distort 
ing effects that such extravagantly long monopolies are having on 
culture,23 Danis Rose's revised edition of Ulysses?his "Reader's 
Edition"-?is one example, 
In 1997, Rose's original Reader's Edition was published simultane 
ously by Macmillan in the United Kingdom and the Lilliput Press in 
the Republic of Ireland. Even before the edition reached bookstores, 
the Joyce Estate initiated legal proceedings,24 alleging that Rose's 
unauthorized project infringed copyright and constituted the tort of 
"passing off" (a legal theory typically reserved for disputes between 
marketers of physical products). After years of sporadic litigation, Mr. 
Justice Lloyd of the English High Court, Chancery Division, ruled 
that Rose's Edition both did and did not violate the Joyce Estate's 
copyright. (The passing-off claim he rejected out of hand.) To the 
extent that Rose had made use of Ulysses manuscript materials which 
had been published after Joyce's death, the Reader's Edition was an 
infringing work, he held. But insofar as Rose drew upon versions of 
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Ulysses published during Joyce's lifetime?and this constituted the 
majority of editorial borrowings?Rose was entitled to the benefits of 
a "compulsory license" which prevented the Estate from objecting to 
use of such lifetime editions and merely required Rose and his pub 
lisher to pay reasonable remuneration to the Estate.25 
This compulsory license was one of the measures adopted in the 
United Kingdom to soften the impact of the revival of lapsed copy 
rights under the EU directive. Essentially, the compulsory license 
permits anyone 
to make use of a revived-copyright work like Ulysses 
without seeking authorization from the copyright owner. All that is 
required is that the user give the owner reasonable advance notice of 
the intended use and eventually pay a reasonable fee or royalty. If the 
parties cannot agree on a fee or royalty, the amount of compensation 
will be determined by Britain's Copyright Tribunal The point of this 
exception is that, while the copyright owner is entitled to reasonable 
remuneration for use of the revived-copyright work, he or she has 
no power to refuse permission. Thus, the basic unfairness of revived 
copyrights is mitigated in the United Kingdom?though not neces 
sarily in other countries of the EU, such as the Republic of Ireland, 
which did not adopt a comparable compulsory-license exception. 
The United Kingdom's enlightened compulsory license takes the 
weapon of censorship out of the hands of copyright owners and sub 
stitutes a limited bargaining power. It also eHminates the specter of 
total market failure, at least with respect to revived-copyright works, 
and guarantees that the Pricelessness Problem and other property 
attitudes will not deprive the public of useful reprints, adaptations, 
and analyses of these works. The compulsory license underscores the 
difference between the necklace and the novel; only for the latter has 
a government interceded to protect the reliance interests of the public. 
As with an easement permitting non-owners a limited right of entry 
upon private land, or the state's exercise of eminent domain for some 
socially beneficial purpose, a compulsory license allows the public to 
gain access to its own culture.26 
Rose's New Reader's Edition is a creature of the U. K. compul 
sory license. The section of Rose's introduction entitled "The Trials 
of the Reader's Edition" contains an illuminating discussion of 
the copyright litigation that the Joyce Estate launched against the 
first Reader's Edition, and of Justice Lloyd's ruling that the edition 
infringed copyright only with respect to readings that Rose had 
drawn from Joyce's unpublished or posthumously published 
manu 
scripts (xlii-lv). But it is Justice Lloyd's conclusion that Rose's use of 
the revived-copyright 1922 Ulysses?which constituted the bulk of the 
Reader's Edition?was shielded by the U. K. compulsory license that 
gave Rose the idea for the New Reader's Edition, which he dedicates 
to "Mr Justice Lloyd, whose Judgment defined the limits and inspired 
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its rationale" (lv). 
Obedient to the law, which Rose calls "Lloyd's law" (with only par 
tial accuracy, since the compulsory license was created by a govern 
ment minister exercising legislative powers, not by a court), the New 
Reader's Edition scrupulously omits all manuscript readings that had 
condemned the Reader's Edition to legal sanction, and replaces what 
Rose calls his "isotext" (the assembled and unemended manuscript 
text that formed the basis of the first Reader's Edition) with "a new 
complex consisting of the 1922 first edition and the 1918 Little Review 
publication" (Ixviii-lxix). Rose then emended this "new complex" 
according to the following rationale: "(1) with substantives, follow 
the 1922 edition/Little Review complex; and, (2) with accidentals, 
follow sound practice" (lxix). This way, Rose's base text and emenda 
tions were drawn entirely from lifetime-published materials that are 
covered by the United Kingdom compulsory license?except for cer 
tain emendations based on what Rose calls "sound practice." These 
latter corrections, quips Rose, "may on occasion reproduce a reading 
in the manuscript, but purely coincidentally" (lxix). After all he has 
been through, he is entitled to this bibliographic Irish bull. 
Having prepared his New Reader's Edition, Rose published it, 
not in Ireland where a comparable compulsory-license exception 
has not been adopted, but in Cornwall under the laughing imprint 
"Houyhnhnm." The New Reader's Edition is a legal triumph in 
the sense that it points the way for others to make use of the U. K. 
compulsory license. At the same time, by internalizing copyright 
strictures as a salient feature of its editorial rationale, the Edition Is 
necessarily shaped and to some degree distorted by legal limitations. 
For although Rose assures us that "nothing of any great significance 
to Ulysses has ,.. been lost" (lxix), he also admits that some desirable 
emendations could not be introduced "without breaching Lloyd's 
law"(lxxi). 
We thus have an edition of Ulysses overtly shaped, in part, by the 
external compulsions of the law/and not solely by the scholarly deci 
sions of the editor?a profoundly social, or sociolegal, text27 The New 
Reader's Edition is the copyright antithesis of Hans Walter Gabler's 
edition of Ulysses. For while Gabler's inclusion of manuscript mate 
rial was freely permitted and, according to some accounts, even 
encouraged by the copyright holder,28 the New Reader's Edition is 
the result of the scrupulous omission of manuscript readings?an 
edition by subtraction. As Seamus Deane points out in his foreword 
to the Edition, this is "a text that has incorporated into itself the prac 
tices of censorship that, in its initial form, it did so much to weaken" 
(vi). While it is important not to overlook the legal silver lining of the 
New Reader's Edition?its resourceful use of the U. K, compulsory 
license?it is undeniable that the volume is something more, and less, 
570 . 
This content downloaded from 129.244.1.198 on Thu, 11 Jul 2013 15:34:05 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
than the product of traditional editing: it is a symptom of the Era of 
Forbidden Quotation. 
III. The Scandal of the Norton Edition of Ulysses 
John Kidd's W. W. Norton Edition of Ulysses is another edition by 
subtraction, but in Kidd's case the end result was zero: the much-tout 
ed volume never appeared. No clear, candid explanation was ever 
given. Both Norton and Kidd occasionally alluded to copyright dif 
ficulties with the Joyce Estate (as discussed below), but the nature of 
those difficulties remained cloaked in mystery, and by the mid-1990s 
Kidd had so damaged his credibility that his explanations could not 
be relied on anyway. Yet at some point he had evidently concluded, 
as I did,29 that the 1922 Paris first edition of Ulysses?the edition he 
had chosen as his base text?is in the public domain in the United 
States. Norton may have shared or been persuaded of that belief, at 
least until intimidation or some other obstacle supervened. We may 
never know for sure. 
Arnold's revised Scandal of "Ulysses": The Life and Afterlife of a 
Twentieth-Century Masterpiece sheds some light on the scandal of the 
much-promised Norton edition of Ulysses. Both Kidd and Norton laid 
the blame for the book's nonappearance on "copyright problems."30 
Norton's president remarked in 2002 that because of "extensions to 
the copyright in the early 1990s,... Kidd's edition can't be published 
for two decades."31 More recently, it was reported by D. T. Max that 
Stephen Joyce had declared himself "implacably opposed" to the 
Kidd edition (35). I do not know how accurate this is. Arnold notes 
only that Norton chose "to take the prudent course and seek copy 
right arrangements" and that Mary Cunnane of Norton referred to 
"our negotiations with the Estate" (297-98). 
I suspect that if the immediate cause of the delay was copyright, 
the ultimate cause was Kidd's failure to finish the edition. Had he 
wrapped it up before the EU revival of copyrights in 1995, there 
might have been no obstacles in the United Kingdom, Ireland, and 
other parts of Europe. Arnold notes that Kidd "had given a warranty 
in his contract [with Norton] that the book was out of copyright/' 
but he does not say whether this referred to the United States or the 
European Union (298). At any rate, by 1997, Arnold comments, Kidd's 
unforthcoming edition was apparently given up for dead by Norton 
and Lilliput (298). Arnold tells this story of false hopes and unkept 
promises in considerable detail, concluding that if "Kidd had moved 
more swiftly, and if Norton had been more determined over copy 
right, his edition of Ulysses might well have appeared" (298). Does 
this mean that Norton would have bargained more doggedly with the 
Estate had Kidd tendered a finished text? Or was Norton just using 
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copyright to cover its blunder in getting involved with this project in 
the first place? 
Arnold's treatment of the Kidd phenomenon here is more clear 
eyed than in his first edition of The Scandal of "Ulysses," published 
in 1991. As a journalist, Arnold has always been in a position to 
recognize that Kidd, despite his talent and learning, was largely a 
creation of the media that promoted him as the boy who would make 
academia's flesh creep. But it is only in the new Scandal that Arnold 
records his skepticism of Kidd's claims and methods, along with a 
less dismissive attitude toward Gabler's achievement. Arnold now 
acknowledges Kidd's "ugly" self-aggrandizement and his failure "to 
deliver on promises" (225); he concedes that Kidd "never presented 
a balanced view of the differences between major errors and minor 
ones [in the Gabler edition of Ulysses]. And this was both tactically 
and strategically intended" (230). Of Kidd's 1988 attack on Gabler 
in the New York Review of Books?which Arnold described in the first 
Scandal as "alert[ing] real people to an academic travesty"32?he 
now concludes that Kidd's "choice of the [Harry] Thrift example 
[of textual error] was a tactic of picking the damning example to 
which was then added a host of lesser errors": "This created the false 
impression that they are all that bad. The Thrift mistake is indefen 
sible on Gabler's part, but apart from the Culler/Buller mistake and 
the Conolly Norman one, all of Kidd's other examples of Gabler's 
errors can be justified. Kidd's article is rhetorically clever but perhaps 
intellectually disingenuous" (228).33 This is a stunning concession 
by an author who chose the word "scandal" with which to arraign 
Gabler's project. Indeed, Arnold's attempt to have it both ways in 
this revised volume?to insert newfound doubts about Kidd while 
retaining verbatim much of the anti-Gabler rhetoric of the first edi 
tion?results in an odd, double-voiced incoherence. It is strange, too, 
that it took Arnold more than a decade to notice Kidd's mean-spirited 
hyperbole; the evidence was all there in 1991 when Arnold published 
the first Scandal. Yet his new candor is marred by traces of the old 
Kiddolatry, unchanged from the 1991 text. Kidd is still "Parsifal-like" 
as he "emerges from the forest to redeem a damaged situation," 
someone who presents arguments "with admirable simplicity and 
clarity for so complicated a subject" (198). Charles Rossman is still 
"the new knight who had brought such sustenance to John Kidd's 
lonely assault" (249). In the years following the release of the first 
Scandal, Arnold had more than enough time to fall out of love with 
such ridiculous phrasemaking; certainly by 2004, this type of rhetori 
cal glamour should have seemed mismatched to the reality of Kidd's 
"lonely assault." 
But what was that reality exactly? We know that Kidd had immense 
erudition and drive; he had selective charm and scary aggressiveness. 
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He could be ruthlessly captious and ingeniously plausible. He pos 
sessed an ability to communicate cagily simplified truths in a way 
that attracted journalists and devastated opponents?opponents who 
usually became verbose in their scramble to reach the high ground 
and deliver comprehensive rebuttals that left the media yawning. 
Kidd was a master of the heaped detail and a miser of the teacher's 
first duty: to show the true basis for disagreement. It was within his 
power to explain that the mass of minor textual delinquencies with 
which he charged Gabler was really a function of Gaoler's having 
adopted a very different editorial approach from the one favored by 
Kidd. The only truly effective and honest way Kidd could have made 
that point was by publishing his own edition. Sadly, he was beset 
by physical illnesses that made his task difficult. It is also possible 
that the more he neared completion of his work, the more his edition 
came to resemble Gabler's. Did it seem that the Oedipal knife was 
turning back on him? Would the path that had begun in numerologi 
cal sympathy with Gabler and then veered into acrimony lead back, 
by divergent theories, to intellectual agreement in the end? I once 
saw a copy of the introduction Kidd had drafted for his idling edi 
tion. Numerology took up a large part of the discussion, along with 
a screed on historical records as a basis for editorial choice. It would 
have been a controversial volume, 
Arnold is a learned and witty journalist who nurses a mistrust of 
established academia. It is probably that quality that caused him to 
be smitten with Kidd in the first place. It also makes him sympathetic 
to Stephen James Joyce's bitter attacks on Joyce scholarship. "Stephen 
Joyce," declares Arnold, "has more than justice on his side in what 
he says and feels [about 'modern scholarship' on Joyce], as well as in 
what he does. One of the attitudes he adopts is a determined sense 
of, and desire for, family privacy" (317-18). I take this stuff to be 
mostly rhetoric. What "justice" does the Joyce Estate have "on [its] 
side" to support the claim that James Joyce, a famous person dead 
for more than sixty-five years now, is entitled to "privacy" as defined 
by his grandson? The law does not recognize such an expansive 
notion of privacy. As to the "more than justice" that Arnold ascribes 
to the Estate's position, what does that mean? Superior morality? 
Hereditary entitlement? Arnold goes on: 
Not only is Stephen [Joyce] protective of his grandfather; he is also 
concerned with intrusions into the private lives of his grandmother, his 
father and mother, and his mother's earlier family, and Lucia, his aunt. 
It is a legitimate position to adopt, and if the protection of it requires a 
stern attitude towards copyright, the only effective control over infor 
mation he can employ, then so be it. (318) 
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"So be it," indeed?because little more than raw fiat supports the 
position that copyrights may properly be used to a gain "effective 
control over information" (318), Arnold's acceptance of the Joyce 
Estate's privacy argument is unfortunate, because that argument is so 
misconceived. Why? First, it is fundamentally incoherent. Nearly all 
of the documents that the Estate has declared off-limits to publishing 
scholars?letters by James Joyce and Joyce family members, essays 
and memoirs by Lucia Joyce and Helen Kastor Fleischman Joyce?are 
either already published or held in archives and collections that are 
generally open to the public. So these documents are not "private" in 
the sense that they are physically or legally inaccessible. We can learn 
any of their secrets; we just cannot quote our findings in articles and 
books or on the Internet. We can kiss but not tell. And how is our 
silence enforced? Through the climate of. fear that many copyright 
holders have cultivated over the past two decades?decades during 
which it has been brought home to us, as never before, how "proper 
tized" modernism really is. 
The second reason why the Estate's privacy argument fails is 
related to the first. Suppose an unpublished letter by James Joyce to 
Harriet Shaw Weaver, held in a university archive, contained the fol 
lowing (wholly invented) remark: "Every day that passes makes me 
more certain that my daughter is the captive of a medical establish 
ment that cannot follow or sympathize with the frolics and detours 
of the creative imagination. Sometimes I think they would break my 
spirit, too, if they could. And once my book is published, perhaps I 
will be declared fair game for these devourers of the spirit." Suppose 
further that a graduate student read this letter and wrote the follow 
ing in her dissertation: "Joyce confided to Harriet Shaw Weaver his 
growing conviction that Lucia's doctors were unable to appreciate her 
creative spirit and its rebelliousness. He recognized in their obtuse 
ness a culture that feared and hated true imagination, and he worried, 
in Blakean terms, that such 'devourers of the spirit' would condemn 
his Work in Progress." Has the student done anything that copyright 
law could punish? No?not in the United States anyway. Most of 
the discussion is lawful paraphrase of Joyce's words, permitted by 
copyright law's idea/expression dichotomy. And the quotation of a 
four-word phrase framed by transformative scholarly commentary is 
a core fair use, which under U, S. law extends to unpublished as well 
as published works.34 If the phrase "devourers of the spirit" is, in fact, 
Blake's and not Joyce's, then no copyright issues exist at all. 
If copyright law permits our hypothetical scholar to write such 
a passage in her dissertation?a passage describing, through para 
phrase and selective quotation, Joyce's deepest fears for his daugh 
ter and his own vulnerability as a creative personality?then what, 
legally and practically, has copyright to do with enforcing privacy? 
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Not much. The porosity of copyrights permits our scholar to spill 
the beans; it is only Joyce's precise wording in its totality that copy 
right may control. 
And this is because copyrights are there to protect 
economic interests, not privacy interests. The "protection of privacy 
is not a function of the copyright law," as one U. S. court succinctly 
observed.35 And when copyrights are used as scarecrows36 to obtain 
"effective control over information," as Arnold puts it (318), we are 
witnessing something that is increasingly being recognized by law 
yers and judges 
as "copyright misuse"?an attempt to extend copy 
right protection beyond its appropriate sphere.37 Copyright misuse 
was one of the issues posed by Shloss in her lawsuits against Stephen 
James Joyce and the Estate of James Joyce.38 
One of Arnold's achievements in his original Scandal was to have 
been the first to explore in detail the impact of copyright on Joyce 
texts and Joyce studies. As I have noted elsewhere, Scandal was help 
ful to my work in this area.39 Arnold enlarges that contribution in the 
new edition by incorporating analyses of the Joyce Estate's lawsuits 
against scholars and publishers. Some of these discussions are less 
than crystal clear/however, such as the attempt to show how the 
absence of an Irish compulsory license comparable to the one for use 
of revived-copyright works in the United Kingdom (discussed above) 
shaped the Estate's litigation against Cork University Press and 
David Pierce's Irish Writing in the Twentieth Century: A Reader.40 And 
while Arnold correctly begins to address the non-copyright status of 
the 1922 Ulysses in the United States (113-14), he abandons this for a 
distracting excursus on the 1934 Random House text and the Little 
Review installments (116-18), with the result that his discussion of the 
American copyright situation is overly complex and opaque. He loses 
the proper focus: the effect of America's copyright law on the 1922 
edition. Nevertheless, I applaud Arnold for his efforts in this area; he 
has gone farther and deeper than many. 
IV. Joyce Studies Annual and the 
Chilling of Traditional Scholarship 
So we have two independently sufficient causes for the nonappear 
ance of John Kidd's edition of Ulysses: copyright problems and the edi 
tor himself. A similar overdetermination is suggested by Tom Staley 
for his decision to terminate Joyce Studies Annual Staley explains in 
JSA 2003 that after editing Joyce journals for forty years, his "enthusi 
asm has waned" but that this is "only half the story" (1). JSA was con 
ceived as a journal that would "publish articles on original materials, 
archives, textual criticism/ bibliography, and biographical research" 
(1). Now that the Joyce Estate has regularly refused permission 
to 
reproduce archival materials?Staley points to the denial of a request 
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to publish Joyce's Defoe lecture in a new translation?the primary 
mission of JSA is thwarted. "Too many potential studies of a textual 
or bibliographical nature are not undertaken because of the reception 
their authors would receive when seeking permission from the Estate, 
One could rail at this recalcitrant position, but to what end?" (1), I 
have to believe that if copyright obstacles had not interfered with 
JSA's founding purpose, Staley's enthusiasm might not have flagged. 
(JSA is now to be published by Fordham University Press under the 
co-editorship of Moshe Gold and Philip Sicker.41) 
This final Texas installment of JSA gives us a valedictory glimpse 
of the goals which originally animated the journal. The first three 
essays are important discussions of the content and context of the 
National Library of Ireland's acquisition in 2002 of what Arnold 
Goldman calls "an astonishing hoard of previously unknown Joyce 
manuscripts" (3). Goldman's short piece is followed by a detailed 
discussion of these new Ulysses materials by Groden, who includes a 
discursive outline of the collection (7-10), a useful chart of the extant 
Ulysses manuscripts as of summer 2002, and the place of the NLI 
purchase within this constellation of documents (13-14). As I noted 
earlier, Groden contents himself with external description of the NLI 
papers, carefully designing around any impulse to quote from these 
examples of Joyce's creative process. Terence Killeen's essay; "Ireland 
Must be Important. . .," rounds out this part of the volume by sur 
veying the condition of Joyce studies in Ireland during the past forty 
years, bringing that history up to the NLTs 2002 purchase, which 
he describes as an example of the new "conspicuous consumption 
capacity of the Irish State" (36). Killeen voices the hope that "Irish 
Joyce scholars" and institutions will rise to the challenge posed by 
this acquisition and the State's official acknowledgment of the impor 
tance of studying James Joyce (36).42 
The remaining essays in the volume represent other scholarly 
approaches that we have come to expect from JSA. Gareth Joseph 
Downes offers a detailed exploration of the significance of Giordano 
Bruno for the young Joyce as he struggled with the claims and influ 
ence of the Roman Catholic Church. Densely combining biography, 
history, and intertextual analysis with close readings of Joyce's own 
texts?notably, The Day of the Rabblement and Stephen Hero?Downes 
provides a convincing glimpse into "the intense anger of Joyce's apos 
tasy" and his use of Bruno to effect "a rupture with the hegemony 
of the Church of his upbringing and education" (65, 70). Jiirgen E, 
Grandt skillfully demonstrates that in Zurich Joyce's work on Ulysses 
underwent a "transformation from a virtuoso performance of English 
to an innovative composition of language" largely as a result of Joyce's 
"increasing familiarity with musical notation and the compositional 
technique of counterpoint" (77). In exploring the "semantic polypho 
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ny" of "Sirens" and other episodes (82), Grandt adds to musicological 
scholarship on Ulysses by nestling 
his readings within the biographi 
cal details of Joyce's Zurich period, such as his friendships with Otto 
Luening and Philip Jarnach. 
Sicker begins with the premise that treatments of Gerty MacDowell 
that have cast her as largely an object of masculine fantasy have 
missed the paradox of her "doubly empowered pleasure as control 
ling subject and as mastering spectacle" (118). Sicker is at his best 
when aligning Gerty with certain literary predecessors such as Oscar 
Wilde's Salome, who, like Gerty, is "a chaste young woman whose 
burning sexual desire and power of bodily display operate, under 
patriarchy, in conjunction with piety and decorum" (104). That seems 
true to me, as does Sicker's conclusion that Gerty "[savors] erotic 
subjectivity and, most remarkably,. . . briefly [meets] Bloom's gaze" 
(128). 
Keri Elizabeth Ames brings impressive classical learning and famil 
iarity with Homer's Greek to bear on her thesis that "Joyce's depic 
tion of Molly constitutes a mythical affirmation of Homer's Penelope 
in spite of Molly's affair with Boylan, not a negation or a rejection of 
Penelope's qualities and values" (133). Ames pursues this insight in 
skillful detail by insisting upon an wmronic parallel between Molly 
and Penelope, noting, for example, that Joyce allows Molly to share 
aspects of Penelope and Helen simultaneously, by placing Molly "in 
the same situation as Penelope, even though Molly is also a version 
of Helen because Molly has erred and cheated" (143). Ames's analy 
sis is clearly the fruit of long and careful reading of both Joyce's and 
Homer's texts. 
Finally, Friedhelm Rathjen in "James Joyce as a Cyclist" takes 
a scrap of received biography concerning Joyce's trips to rural 
Connemara in the summer of 1912 and adjusts the record by attempt 
ing to distinguish between when Joyce traveled by bicycle and when 
he must have gone by train. In lavishing so much erudition on a 
minor point, Rathjen seeks to remind us that "there is still much in the 
mass of biographical data about Joyce which should not be taken for 
granted" (180), This useful little exercise seems an appropriate way 
to conclude the Texas branch of JSA, on a note of witty biographical 
questioning and skepticism, and with a gesture towards the riches 
that remain untapped in the growing archives of the world. Tom 
Staley is to be congratulated on a long and enviable career 
as editor 
of journals and grower of archives. 
V* Resisting the Patentization of Copyrights 
In the patent context, design-arounds expand the knowledge base, 
inject competition into the marketplace, force patent owners 
to accept 
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sub-monopoly prices, and make a more diverse array of goods and 
services available to larger numbers of purchasers. They lift some of 
the deadweight loss created by monopoly The same cannot be said for 
design-around scholarship. The humanities are not commerce, and a 
scholarly monograph is not a widget. The materials that scholars seek 
to quote and reproduce are not useful ideas and processes but texts 
photographs, and other records of richly individualized human sub 
jectivity. While some methods for making do with second-best?fair 
use and the idea/expression dichotomy, for example?have their 
time-honored place in humanistic studies when those methods are 
not too timidly employed, in many cases there really is no substitute 
for the author's words. 
Take Joyce's 1909 letter in which he describes for Nora the ivory 
necklace he has purchased for her: 
Your present is lying before me on the table as I write, ready. . . , [He 
describes in great detail the case, the gold chain, the five small ivory 
cubes, and the larger "tablet" in the center of the chain.] This tablet has 
on both sides an inscription and the letters are engraved into it.... On 
the face the words are Love is unhappy and the words on the back are 
When Love is away. The five dice mean the five years of trial and misun 
derstanding, and the tablet which unites the chain tells of the strange 
sadness we felt and our suffering when we were divided. (Lettersll 
245-46) 
Although I have "designed around" my inclination to reproduce 
Joyce's entire message to Nora, even this excerpt shows-that para 
phrase could never do justice to Joyce's finely carved melancholy. 
But more than biographical truth, Joyce's language shows us that the 
artist and the man cannot be neatly divided, no matter how many 
times "privacy" is invoked to discourage the use of personal docu 
ments. Why are we moved by the letter's strange, poignant mixture 
of finicking detail and lover's pathos? If we can begin to answer that 
question by examining this fragment of Joyce's private life, then per 
haps we can gain insight into why we are so profoundly affected by 
the painstaking inventory of the feast in "The Dead" or by the gar 
rulous, sleep-deprived catalogues of "Ithaca." It is Joyce's passionate, 
compulsive engagement with fact filtered through language, whether 
the occasion is homely or Homeric, that reminds us of why we read 
both Ulysses and his letter to Nora. Only hopelessly private persons 
would deny the continuity between the two. 
Design-arounds help a manufacturer stay on the legal side of 
protected "prior art." But a scholar's use of ultra-safe substitutions 
for literary art is a different matter. Timid, bloodless paraphrase, 
unrelieved by forthright detail or fair-use quotation, does not inject 
a functional equivalent into the intellectual marketplace/Instead, 
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we get circumlocution, approximation, vagueness, le mot injuste. 
Such furtive and unreliable measures go too far. When they are not 
required by law or practical necessity, let's avoid them?and urge 
publishers to avoid them. Obtaining copyright permissions may be 
difficult and sometimes hopeless just now. The public domain cannot 
hasten to our aid; it moves on a slow wheel. But copyrights are bless 
edly porous. Let's not give aid and comfort to those who would turn 
them into patents. 
NOTES 
1 The views expressed in this review essay are my own and not necessar 
ily those of my law firm; the Stanford Law School's Center for Internet and 
Society, its Cyberlaw Clinic and Fair Use Project; Professor Carol Loeb Shloss; 
or the James Joyce Quarterly. I would like to thank the following individuals 
for their helpful comments on drafts of this piece: Laura Barnes, Luca Crispi, 
Kevin J. H. Dettmar, Judith Harrington, Peter Hirtle, Sebastian Knowles, 
David S. Olson, David Pierce, Charles Rossman, Paul Saint-Amour, and Lee 
Zimmerman. 
2 The Federal Circuit has described patent design-arounds as follows: 
Keeping track of a competitor's products and designing new and 
possibly better or cheaper functional equivalents is the stuff of which 
competition is made and is supposed to benefit the consumer. One of 
the benefits of a patent system is its so-called "negative incentive" to 
"design around" a competitor's products, even when they are patented, 
thus bringing a steady flow of innovations to the marketplace. 
Westvaco Corp. v. International Paper Co., 991 F.2d 735, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1993), 
quoting State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 K2d 1226,1235-36 (Fed. Cir. 
1985), 3 Patents in the United States currently last for twenty years from the date 
the application is filed with the U. S. Patent Office: 35 U.S.C ? 154(a)(2), That 
is a much shorter term than author's life plus seventy years, or ninety-five 
years from the date of publication, which are the current durations of copy 
rights in the United States. Thus, if copyrights come to resemble patents by 
losing what I describe in this review essay as their "porosity," copyrights will 
turn into super-patents because of their great longevity. 4 
SeeMorrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co,, 379 F.2d 675, 679 (1stCir. 1967). 5 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119,122 (2d Cir. 1930). 6 
By "market failure," I allude to an important article by Wendy J. Gordon 
in which she argues that fair use "should be awarded to the defendant in a 
copyright infringement action when (1) market failure is present; (2) transfer 
of the use to defendant is socially desirable; and (3) an award of fair use 
would not cause substantial injury to the incentives of the plaintiff copy 
right owner"?see "Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic 
Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors," Columbia Law Revietv, 
82 (December 1982), 1614. Examples of market failure include situations in 
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which copyright owners cannot be found or unreasonably refuse to grant 
permission to quote. Total market failure, as I use the phrase, occurs when the 
fair-use privilege, though applicable according to Gordon's criteria, cannot 
be relied upon to remedy a breakdown of bargaining between the copyright 
owner, and the aspiring user?as when 
a publisher insists that permissions 
for all scholarly use of quotations, no matter how reasonable or transforma 
tive, be obtained. 
7 Paul K. Saint-Amour, review of William M. Landes and Richard Posner, 
The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. 
Press, 2003), in Modernism/modernity, 12 (September 2005), 511. 8 
"Deadweight loss" is a term used to describe the social costs of monop 
oly; in the present context, it generally signifies under-use of intellectual 
property. See Christopher Sprigman, "Reform(a!iz)ing Copyright," Stanford 
Law Review, 57 (November 2004), 523-24: 
Any copyright system that grants exclusive rights, whether based in 
a utilitarian or natural /moral rights conception, imposes a number of 
different social costs. First, there is an obvious economic cost, which is a 
specific instance of the general problem of monopoly: If a particular cre 
ative work has a market value, exclusive rights will enable the creator 
to charge a supracompetitive price. Consequently, access to the work 
will be denied to those who value it in excess of the competitive price, 
but less than the supracompetitive price that the monopolist is able to 
command. Copyright, then, creates deadweight losses in markets for 
expression. 
When a copyrighted work cannot be used at all because of the owner's exag 
gerated valuation of the property, then deadweight loss is at its maximum. 9 
Copyrights and other forms of intellectual property are often referred 
to as "public goods." "A public good is something that is not depleted by 
use and can be held by more than one person at a time. It can be taken from 
the owner by others at minimal cost," writes Stephen L. Carter, in "Owning 
What Doesn't Exist," Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, 13 (Winter 1990), 
102. Carter continues, noting that public goods are "subject to non-rivalrous 
consumption, in the sense that one user's use of the idea does not reduce the 
value of the idea to another who wishes to use it"; it can be used by others 
"at a cost close to zero" (p. 102). 10 A photograph of Stephen Joyce's wife, Solange Raythchine Joyce, wear 
ing the necklace maybe found at <http:/ /www. themodernword.com /Joyce/ 
jj_stephen?solange.html> (last visited on 28 July 2007). 11 At least as early as 1988, Stephen Joyce was on record as opposing schol 
ars' use of Joyce family letters in their work. See Caryn James, "Joyce Family 
Letters in Literary Debate," New York Times (15 August 1988), 13, -15. More 
recently, D. T. Max, in "The Injustice Collector: Is James Joyce's Grandson 
Suppressing Scholarship?" The New Yorker (19 June 2006), 35, has described 
the Joyce Estate's attitude toward unpublished letters, family privacy, and 
scholarship: 
[Stephen Joyce] rejects nearly every request to quote fro 
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letters-Stephen's primary motive has been to put a halt to work that, 
in his view, either violates his family's privacy or exceeds the bounds 
of reputable scholarship. The two-decade-long effort has also been an 
exercise in power?an attempt to establish his own centrality in regard 
to anything involving his grandfather. If you want to write about James 
Joyce and plan to quote more than a few short passages, you need 
Stephen's consent. 
He has said, "We have proven that we are willing 
to take any necessary action to back and enforce what we legitimately 
believe in." 
Mr. Joyce also told Max that "the Joyces' private life was 'no one's fucking 
business'" (p. 36). Further references will be cited parenthetically in the text. 12 This illustration is hypothetical only. I know of no actual refusal to sell 
Nora's necklace or of an Australian Ph.D. candidate seeking permission to 
reproduce the 3 September 1909 letter by Joyce. I base my imagined scenario 
on many public and private statements by representatives of the Joyce Estate 
regarding the purported urgency of protecting, as Max describes the Estate's 
position, "what remains of the much abused privacy of the Joyce family" (p. 
36). 13 Lawrence Lessig, "The Creative Commons," Florida Lata Review, 55 (July 
2003), 775. 
141 do not address here the obvious limiting case of an unknown, unpub 
lished letter kept under lock and key by its physical owner. While the text of 
such an occulted document is theoretically a public good, for all practical pur 
poses, the letter is a private good, both as tangible and intangible property. It 
may be that such a text is not worth thinking of as a public good, just as a tree 
falling in an unpeopled forest arguably makes no sound. The destruction of 
such a document may be more an ethical problem than a public-goods prob 
lem. While the destroyer might fancy his act a form of familial gallantry, it is 
also possible to see it as historically and culturally reckless, since, if the letter 
concerns a figure as important as Joyce, its destruction might (if falling trees 
in earless forests do make a sound) harm many more people (generations 
of scholars and students; the public that wants to know) than it protects (a 
few family members who claim privacy for themselves and the unconsulted 
deceased author). The moral problem and the public-goods problem con 
verge conspicuously when the owner seeks to suppress the contents of a pub * 
licly accessible document, not by disporting himself with a box of matches in 
his attic, but by threatening to enforce a copyright claim in the text. 15 Gordon, "Excuse and Justification in the Law of Fair Use: Commodifica 
tion and Market Perspectives," The Commodification of Information: Social, 
Political, and Cultural Ramifications, ed. Niva Elkin-Koren and Neil W. Netanel 
(The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002), pp. 175-76. Further references 
will be cited parenthetically in the text as "Commodification." 16 Adam Smith wrote, in The Wealth of Nations (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago 
Press, 1976), 4:477: 
By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, [a 
merchant} intends only his own security; and by directing that industry 
in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends 
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only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an 
invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. 
Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By 
pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society 
more effectually than when he really intends to promote it. 
17 The necklace that Joyce presented to Nora combined intellectual and 
physical property by bearing on its ivory tablet a line from one of Joyce's 
poems. But I am referring to the necklace only in its character as physical 
chattel. 
18 
J, C C Mays, Fredson Bowers and the Irish Wolfhound (Ballybeg, Ireland: 
Coracle, 2002). Further references will be cited parenthetically in the text. 19 Carol Loeb Shloss, Lucia Joyce: To Dance in the "Wake" (New York: Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux, 2003). One of Shloss's critics, John McCourt, in a review of 
the book in JJQ, 41 (Fall 2003/Winter 2004), 253, has had to admit: 
It is hard not to have sympathy for Shloss knowing that she has made 
it her mission to pluck Lucia from obscurity and give her the place she 
feels she deserves despite being forced by Joyce's heir to dismantle and 
delete hard-won material and rewrite this book several times. It is hard 
not to imagine that much of what I have criticized as speculation may, in 
fact, be the shadowy remains of what the author was obliged to omit, 
Shloss's excisions have been restored on a website created for that purpose 
at <www.lucia-the-authors-cut.info/>. This restoration followed upon the 
settlement of Shloss's lawsuits against the Estate and Mr. Joyce, described 
below, 
20 Luca Crispi (formerly James Joyce Research Fellow at the National 
Library of Ireland and co-curator of the NLTs Ulysses exhibition, and now on 
the faculty of University College Dublin) has devised an analytical code by 
which the relationships among pre-publication Ulysses materials, including 
the important new acquisitions by the NLI, may be perceived at some level of 
useful generality, and he described it in an email to me on 29 November 2006. 
For example, Crispi converts the NLFs "Penelope" manuscript into "x"s, 
"o"s, and full-stops, with the "x"s color-coded to indicate main text, interlin 
eal additions, and verso additions. The "o"s point to text that is on the next 
extant version?for example, the Rosenbach manuscript?with a bold font 
indicating text that is in that version but not in the NLI draft. Italic text and 
full-stops are used to indicate additional levels of composition. As ingenious 
and useful as this is, Crispi himself admits that it is not a "scholarly version 
because it cannot take into account all the minute but relevant variants, but 
it is the best way I can find to represent the information without using one 
copyrighted word." 21 See, for example/Michael Groden, "The National Library of Ireland's 
New Joyce Manuscripts: A Statement and Document Descriptions," JJQ, 
39 (Fall 2001), 29-51, and "The National Library of Ireland's New Joyce 
Manuscripts: A Narrative and Document Summaries," Journal of Modern 
Literature, 26 (Fall 2002), 1-16. The article by Groden that is contained in the 
volume of Joyce Studies Annual under review here, "The National Library of 
' 
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Ireland's New Joyce Manuscripts: An Outline and Archive Comparisons" 
(pp. 5-17), useful 
as it is, is another instance of scholarly designing-around. 22 
Despite copyright hindrances, institutional archives strive mightily 
to bring the benefits of digital media to their collections. For example, the 
National Library of Ireland's interactive digital displays of the Ulysses manu 
scripts acquired by the NLI in 2002, which were unveiled during Dublin's 
2004 Rejoyce celebrations, are an astonishing educational tool. But the NLI 
would have been hard pressed to go forward with these displays had it not 
been for an emergency copyright amendment enacted at the eleventh hour by 
the Irish legislature in response to purported threats by the Joyce Estate. The 
amendment specifically allows an institution to place on display an artistic 
or literary "work, or a copy thereof, in a place or premises to which members 
of the public have access"?Irish Copyright and Related Rights Act, section 
40(7)(a) (as amended). For a lively discussion in the Irish Senate of the amend 
ment and what precipitated it, see Seanad Eireann, vol. 176 (27 May 2004), 
Copyright and Related Rights (Amendment) Bill 2004: Second Stage (found 
at <http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/S/0176/S.0176.200405270008. 
html> (last visited on 28 July 2007)). 23 See Robert Spoo, Three Myths for Aging Copyrights: Tithonus, Dorian Gray, 
Ulysses (Dublin: National Library of Ireland, 2004), passim. 24 The Writ of Summons in the case was issued on 10 June 1997. 25 See Sweeney v. Macmillan Publishers Ltd., [2001] EWHC Ch 460 (22 
November 2001)?available on the British and Irish Legal Information 
website found at <http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2001/460. 
html> (last visited on 28 July 2007). 26 
Exceptions to intellectual property, such as fair use, have been compared 
to the use of easements and eminent domain in the area of real property. 
According to Dan L. Burk, in "Muddy Rules for Cyberspace," Cardozo Law 
Review, 21 (October 1999), 158-59, "at least one view of copyright fair use is to 
view it as a sort of public easement on the copyright owners' property rights, 
allowing limited access and use to the property if the public interest in the 
use is sufficiently pronounced," 
271 allude to the theory of bibliography and textual editing which holds, 
in contrast to traditional analytical bibliography with its focus on recovering 
authorial intentions, that "it would now be more useful to describe bibliogra 
phy as the study of the sociology of texts"?-see D. F. McKenzie, Bibliography 
and the Sociology of Texts (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1999), p. 5, 
Another major scholar of the sociahtext edition is, of course, Jerome McGann, 
who has often cited the late McKenzie as a pioneer in this area. See, for 
example, McGann, "From Text to Work: Digital Tools and the Emergence of 
the Social Text," Romanticism on the Net, 41-42 (February-May 2006), passim. 
Copyrights and copyright law are emerging as forces that must be reckoned 
with in examining the sociology of texts. 28 The Estate's "new copyright" motive in approving the Hans Walter 
Gabler edition, first discussed by Charles Rossman in "The New Ulysses: 
The Hidden Controversy," New York Review of Books (8 December 1988), 53, is 
almost always described in ways that muddy the legal and historical issues. 
Take Bruce Arnold's reference in his revised Scandal of "Ulysses" to "the James 
Joyce Estate's keen interest in the renewal of copyright" (p. 237). He alludes 
in the same book to "the legal right of the James Joyce Estate to extend copy 
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right" and to the "new copyright claim for Ulysses based on the re-editing" 
(pp. 290,291). Each of these characterizations?"new copyright," "extended] 
copyright," "renewal of copyright"?is an inaccurate way of describing a 
derivative-work copyright; each implies that any copyright claimed for the 
Gabler text was part of a zero-sum game in which the new monopoly-pro 
tected edition would oust all other texts or possible texts, as a matter of law. 
But when the Random House edition of Gabler's text appeared in 1986, expi 
ration of copyright in all lifetime-published editions of Ulysses was only five 
years away in the United Kingdom and other parts of Europe. Gabler, Peter 
du Sautoy, and the edition's advisors knew this. (See the letter from du Sautoy 
to Philip Gaskell, dated 5 May 1983, in the Richard Ellmann Papers, McFarlin 
Library Special Collections, University of Tulsa.) Of course, they expected 
that the new derivative-work copyright in the Gabler Ulysses, combined with 
the edition's anticipated prestige in the marketplace, would make it the ver 
sion everyone would want to own. Nevertheless, the legal reality was that 
alternatives to the Gabler text were then still possible, based upon editions 
that were soon to shed their copyrights. That prospect receded when copy 
rights in lifetime-published editions of Ulysses were revived throughout the 
EU in 1995?though a few projects got through, such as Jeri Johnson's reprint 
of the 1922 text of Ulysses (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1993), and the Penguin 
series of Joyce's works that appeared in the early 1990s under the general edi 
torship of Seamus Deane. However, in an essay in the volume of Joyce Studies 
Annual under review here, Terence Killeen states that the Penguin "project 
was dogged by sustained hostility from the James Joyce Estate. It prevented 
potentially the finest of the editions, J. C C Mays's of Poems and Exiles, from 
achieving completeness" (p. 34). It is likely that some of the materials Mays 
wished to include had a different copyright status from lifetime-published 
writings by Joyce which were briefly in the public domain. 29 See Spoo, "Copyright Protectionism and its Discontents: The Case of 
James Joyce's Ulysses in America," The Yale Law Journal, 108 (December 1998), 
633-67. 
30 David Abel, "Professor Who Rose over Joyce Critique Falls from Grace 
at BU," Boston Globe (9 April 2002), Bl. 31 This statement is attributed to W. W. Norton's president, Drake McFeely, 
in Abel's article (p. Bl). 32 Bruce Arnold, The Scandal of "Ulysses": The Sensational Life of a Twentieth 
Century Masterpiece (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), p. 188. The odd thing 
is that Arnold leaves the characterization of the Gabler text as an "academic 
travesty" in his revised Scandal but hedges it about with newly interpolated 
criticisms of Kidd (p. 230), The result is a lack of coherency about Arnold's 
ultimate point of view. 33 This passage from the revised Scandal, like the others quoted here, is not 
to be found in the 1991 edition, Arnold spliced it into the otherwise relatively 
uncritical treatment of Kidd remaining from the original 1991 text. 34 "The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of 
fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the [fair use] fac 
tors"?17 U,S,C. ? 107. 35 Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385,395 (4th Cir. 2003). See also Rosemont Enterprises, 
Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 R2d 303, 311 (2d Cir, 1966) (Lumbard, J., con 
curring: "It has never been the purpose of the copyright laws to restrict the 
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dissemination of information about persons in the public eye even though 
those concerned may not welcome the resulting publicity") 36 The concept of intellectual property used as a "scarecrow" to inhibit 
innovation was advanced by Judge Learned Hand to describe the use of 
patents to prevent competition?see Bresnick v. U.S. Vitamin Corp., 139 E2d 
239,242 (2d Cir. 1943). 
37 
Copyright misuse is discussed and adjudicated in an increasing number 
of judicial decisions. See, for example, Intel Corp. & Dell Inc. v. Commonwealth 
Scientific & Industrial Research Organization, 455 E3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 
2006); Assessment Technologies of Wisconsin, LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 
647 (7th Cir. 2003); Practice Management Information Corp. v. American Medical 
Association, 111 E3d 516, 520 (9th Cir.1997); and In re Napster, Inc. Copyright 
Litigation, 191 F. Supp. 2d 1087,1103 (N.D. Cal. 2002). The doctrine of copy 
right misuse is discussed in William E Patry and Richard A. Posner, "Fair 
Use and Statutory Reform in the Wake of Eldred," California Law Reviezv, 92 
(December 2004), 1658-59. 38 The lawsuits brought by Shloss were entitled Carol Loeb Shloss v. Sean 
Sweeney and The Estate of James Joyce (case number C 06-3718) and Carol Loeb 
Shloss v. Stephen James Joyce (case number CV 07-00517) in the Northern 
District of California federal court. These cases were settled, favorably to 
Shloss, on 16 March 2007. On Shloss's motion, the court then issued an order 
requiring the Joyce Estate to pay her attorneys' fees. The amount of fees has 
yet to be determined. I and my present and former law firms have served as 
co-counsel for Shloss, along with Lessig and the attorneys at Stanford Law 
School's Center for Internet and Society and Fair Use Project. 39 See Spoo, "Copyright Protectionism" (pp. 647 n76, 648 n81,656 nl26). 40 David Pierce, Irish Writing in the Twentieth Century: A Reader (Cork: Cork 
Univ. Press, 2000), pp. 310-11. 41 See Journals: Joyce Studies Annual, found at <http://www.utexas.edu/ 
utpress/journals/jjsa.html> (last visited 26 November 2006). 42 In September 2006, Anne Fogarty was appointed to a newly created 
Professorship of James Joyce Studies in the School of English and Drama at 
University College Dublin. 
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